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Abstract
We investigate what kind of competitive pressure induces existing ¯rms to engage in
more intensive innovation activities. We examine two types of competitive pressure: a
price decrease in competitive fringe ¯rms and a quality improvement therein. We use an
oligopoly model with vertical di®erentiation to investigate this question. We show that a
decrease in the exogenous price of competitive ¯rms induces the two existent leading ¯rms
(one high-quality ¯rm and one mid-quality ¯rm) to engage in quality investments more if
the ex ante quality level of the high quality product is large enough; otherwise, only the
mid-quality ¯rm engages more in quality investment. We also show that an increase in the
exogenous quality level of competitive ¯rms diminishes the incentive of the mid-quality ¯rm
to engage in quality investments.
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1 Introduction
Almost all ¯rms su®er from competitive pressures applied by domestic and foreign competi-
tors. As a reaction to competitive pressure, many ¯rms try to restructure their production
environments. For instance, they try to improve their production e±ciencies (engage in pro-
cess innovation) and their product qualities (engage in product innovation). Because most
¯rms in the real world face these problems, investigating this reaction is important.
In reality, companies in the People's Republic of China (China) pose severe competitive
challenges to companies in many industries around the world. As a real world example in the
bicycle industry, we refer to how non-Chinese incumbent ¯rms react to competitive pressure
by Chinese ¯rms.1 To meet the threat of low-cost, low-price competition posed by small-sized
Chinese bicycle ¯rms, the Republic of China (Taiwan)'s two leading bicycle assemblers, Giant
and Merida (which are known around the world), have formed Taiwan's A-Team, an association
of Taiwanese bicycle assemblers and suppliers, since 2002. These two companies are the prime
movers of Taiwan's A-Team. The A-Team also includes 19 suppliers|11 original members and
an additional 8 suppliers that joined a year after the organization was founded. Taiwan's bicycle
industry A-Team has had a mandate for improving industry performance in three main areas:
production e±ciency, product development, and market intelligence. Antony Lo, who serves
as the president of Giant and A-Team, told journalists that he hoped for the establishment of
A-team to break the myth that it is not possible for competitors to cooperate in Taiwan. He
also noted that A-Team's mandate was to use existing, high quality labor and technology to
focus on product di®erentiation to increase value adds so that Taiwanese bicycle production
might be seen as distinct from that in China and elsewhere. In total, three goals for the venture
were put forward: (1) the implementation of lean production both within assembly plants and
throughout the supply chain, (2) e®ective co-innovation with suppliers, and (3) co-marketing.
This case in the bicycle industry implies that the two leading assemblers, Giant and Merida,
need to further improve their product quality. This also means that a higher intensive com-
1The assertions in this paragraph are based on Brook¯eld et al. (2008).
2
petitive pressure enhances the incentives of those ¯rms to engage in quality investments. As
summarized in Vives (2008) and Schmutzler (2009), however, the well-known theories in indus-
trial organization do not clearly explain situations in which more intensive competitive pressure
enhances the incentives of those ¯rms to engage in quality investments. Although several pa-
pers consider the investment incentives of ¯rms that produce vertically di®erentiated goods
(Motta, 1992, 1993; Rosenkranz, 1995), these papers do not discuss the relation between com-
petitive pressure and the incentives of such ¯rms to engage in quality investments. Greenstein
and Ramey (1998) is an exception in that it considers such a relation. The main purpose of
their paper is to reassess Arrow's (1962) results concerning the e®ect of market structure on
the returns from process innovation in the two cases: a vertically di®erentiated duopoly and a
monopoly with competitive fringe. Previous papers do not discuss the change in competitive
pressure caused by competitive fringe ¯rms in the context of R&D investments. We need to
know what kind of competitive pressure induces existing ¯rms to engage in more intensive
innovation activities. We therefore provide a simple model to explain it.
The model structure is as follows. There are two leading ¯rms and a competitive fringe of
¯rms. The leading ¯rms produce vertically di®erentiated products. The quality level of the two
products is higher than that of competitive ¯rms. Given the exogenous price of competitive
¯rms, the two leading ¯rms compete in the ¯nal product market. In this market, therefore,
each consumer has the following four options: he/she purchases (1) the highest quality product,
(2) the mid-quality product, (3) the lowest quality product, and (4) nothing. We investigate
how a decrease in the exogenous price of competitive ¯rms changes the marginal gains of the
two leading ¯rms from quality improvements in the two products. We interpret the decrease in
the exogenous price of competitive ¯rms as intensi¯ed competitive pressure. We believe that
this model setting captures the example of the Taiwanese bicycle industry mentioned earlier:
the two leading ¯rms are analogous to Giant and Merida, and the decrease in the exogenous
price of competitive ¯rms is akin to the threat of low-cost, low-price competition by small
Chinese bicycle ¯rms. Note that the situation discussed in our paper is related in the context
of minimum quality standard (Scarpa, 1998; Valletti, 2000). A minimum quality standard
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compulsorily enhances the product quality of ¯rms that would produce lower quality products
if the standard did not exist. This standard is related to the exogenous competitive pressure
discussed in our paper. The models in Scarpa (1998) and Valletti (2000) cannot distinguish
between the e®ect of the changes in the price and quality of low quality ¯rms (which enforce a
minimum quality standard) on the ¯rms that produce high quality products.
We show that a decrease in the exogenous price of competitive ¯rms induces the existing
leading ¯rms to engage more in quality investments if the ex ante quality level of the highest
quality product is large enough; otherwise, only the mid-quality ¯rm engages more in quality
investment. We also show that an increase in the exogenous quality level of competitive ¯rms
diminishes the incentive of the mid-quality ¯rm to engage in quality investments. Because our
paper distinguishes between the two e®ects of competition enhancement, a price decrease in
competitive products and a quality improvement in competitive products, we can clarify the
di®erence between the two e®ects. Our results add a new insight to the existing knowledge on
R&D and on the quality standard. Moreover, in the bicycle industry, the result is consistent
with the ¯eld experience of Brook¯eld et al (2008) when they visited Giant in September 2011.
Brook¯eld et al observed site innovation and an innovation-driven atmosphere in Giant. For
example, the logistics chain of the subcontractor parts right from subcontractors' facilities to
the company's plant is not only smooth but also considers the quality requirements. Many
operators have implemented measures to ensure quality in both the machining line and the
assembly line to meet quality assurance standards. Furthermore, our result clearly indicates
the condition that existing ¯rms can collaborate with each other in their R&D activities, which
provides a useful managerial implication for existing companies facing competitive threats from
emerging ¯rms.
Ishida et al. (2011) is closely related to our paper. They consider a Cournot competition
model with heterogeneous ¯rms engaging in cost-reducing activities. They show that the entry
of weak ¯rms, which can also engage in cost-reducing R&D, enhances the incentive of existing
e±cient ¯rms to engage in cost-reducing investments. This implies that the leading ¯rms in
this market enhance their R&D incentives. In their model, because ¯rms produce homogenous
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products, all ¯rms directly compete with each other. In other words, only their cost conditions
di®er. On the other hand, in our paper, the products are vertically di®erentiated. This implies
that the entry of low-quality competitive ¯rms does not equally in°uence the incumbents.
Moreover, our paper shows that an entry does not enhance the incentive of the leading ¯rm,
which produces the highest quality product, but does enhance the incentive of the mid-level
¯rm, which produces the second-best quality product. This property of the relation between
competitiveness and innovation incentives in Ishida et al. (2011) is quite di®erent from ours.
2 Model
The utility of a consumer depends simply on the price and the quality of the product. Each
consumer is supposed to buy a unit of product from the ¯rm that ensures to him/her the
highest utility, except if all the prices exceed his/her income. Consumers are supposed to have
the same income y but are di®erent in their intensity of preference for quality.
Before we discuss a duopoly model with competitive ¯rms, we explain a simple monopoly
model with competitive ¯rms, which clari¯es the e®ect of competitive ¯rms on the incentives
of dominant ¯rms to engage in quality investments.
Suppose that there are a dominant ¯rm and competitive fringe ¯rms. We call this situation
a \monopoly with fringe ¯rms." The product quality of the dominant ¯rm is qd and that of
competitive fringe ¯rms is qc. The former is larger than the latter, that is, qd > qc. The
conditional indirect utility of a consumer of type µ buying one unit of product i (i = d; c) is
given by
Vi(µ) = y ¡ pi + µqi; (1)
where pi is the price of product i. Consumers are supposed to be distributed on [0; 1]. The
parameter µ 2 [0; 1] is interpreted to be the intensity of preference for quality. The distribution
and the density functions are given by F (µ) and f(µ) = F 0(µ). We assume that the functions
satisfy the standard second-order condition of the monopolist's optimization problem.
We assume that the price of competitive fringe ¯rms, pc, is exogenously given. This means
that competitive fringe ¯rms do not have any market power. Their available production tech-
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nology determines the price of their products. For instance, when the factors for production
(e.g., labor, material, facility) are cheap, the price pc is low. The marginal cost of the dominant
¯rm is constant and assumed to be zero for simplicity.
We consider a simple one-shot game. The dominant ¯rm sets its price pd. Under the model,
we investigate the e®ects of the changes in pc and qc on the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to
engage in quality investments.
3 Result
3.1 Price reduction
First, we investigate the e®ects of a decrease in pc on the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to
engage in quality investments.
Let p¤d be the equilibrium price. The pro¯t of the dominant ¯rm is
¼d(p¤d) = p
¤
d
µ
1¡ F
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¶
:
The marginal gain from the quality improvement is given by
@¼d(p¤d)
@qd
=
p¤d(p
¤
d ¡ pc)
(qd ¡ qc)2 f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
:
If a decrease in pc increases the derivative, it enhances the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to
improve its product quality; that is, the latter statement holds if
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@pc
< 0:
We now show that this inequality holds. A simple calculation yields
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@pc
=¡ p
¤
d
(qd ¡ qc)2
·
f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¸
(2)
+
1
(qd ¡ qc)2
·
(2p¤d ¡ pc)f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d(p
¤
d ¡ pc)
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¸
dp¤d
dpc
:
Using the ¯rst-order condition, we derive dp¤d=dpc:
dp¤d
dpc
=
µ
f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¶Áµ
2f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¶
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Note that the denominator of this fraction is equal to the product of the second-order con-
dition and ¡1. This implies that this denominator is positive. Substituting dp¤d=dpc into
@2¼d(p¤d)=@qd@pc, we have
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@pc
= ¡ pc
(qd ¡ qc)2 f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶Áµ
2f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¶
< 0:
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A decrease in pc enhances the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to engage in
quality improvement. That is,
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@pc
< 0:
A decrease in pc has two e®ects. First, a decrease in pc makes the indi®erent consumer's µ
larger. In other words, consumers around this indi®erent consumer are highly sensitive to
quality improvement (an e®ect that we call the \direct e®ect"). A slight improvement in the
product quality signi¯cantly decreases the indi®erent consumer's µ when pc is small. The direct
e®ect enhances the incentive to improve product quality. This is related to the ¯rst term of
@2¼d(p¤d)=@qd@pc in (2). Second, a decrease in pc diminishes the demand for the dominant ¯rm.
The decrease induces the dominant ¯rm to lower its price pd (an e®ect that we call the \pricing
e®ect"). The pricing e®ect diminishes the gain in quality improvement. This is related to
the second term of @2¼d(p¤d)=@qd@pc in (2). In this model setting, the direct e®ect dominates
the pricing e®ect. Therefore, a decrease in pc enhances the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to
engage in quality improvement.
3.2 Quality improvement
We consider another scenario wherein the competitive condition of the dominant ¯rm worsens.
An increase in qc also enhances the competitiveness of the market. If the marginal gain of
the dominant ¯rm from the quality improvement is monotonically increasing in qc, an increase
in qc enhances the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to improve its product quality; that is, the
latter statement holds if
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@qc
> 0:
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We now show that the inequality does not hold ; that is, an increase in qc diminishes the
incentive of the dominant ¯rm to improve its product quality. A simple calculation yields
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@qc
=
p¤d(p
¤
d ¡ pc)
(qd ¡ qc)3
·
2f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¸
(3)
+
1
(qd ¡ qc)2
·
(2p¤d ¡ pc)f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d(p
¤
d ¡ pc)
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¸
dp¤d
dqc
:
Using the ¯rst-order condition, we have
dp¤d
dqc
= ¡
1
qd ¡ qc
µ
(2p¤d ¡ pc)f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¶
µ
2f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¶ :
Substituting it into @2¼d(p¤d)=@qd@pc, we have
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@qc
= ¡ p
2
c
(qd ¡ qc)3 f
2
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶Áµ
2f
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶
+
p¤d
qd ¡ qc f
0
µ
p¤d ¡ pc
qd ¡ qc
¶¶
< 0:
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in qc diminishes the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to engage in
quality improvement. That is,
@2¼d(p¤d)
@qd@qc
< 0:
An increase in qc also has two e®ects. First, an increase in qc makes the indi®erent consumer's
µ larger. This is similar to the direct e®ect in the previous subsection. This is related to the
¯rst term of @2¼d(p¤d)=@qd@qc in (3). Second, an increase in qc diminishes the demand for the
dominant ¯rm. This has two negative e®ects: the \pricing e®ect" and the \elasticity e®ect."
The former is similar to that in the previous section. The latter is that an increase in qc enhances
the price elasticity of demand. This is an additional negative e®ect on the incentive to engage
in quality improvement although a decrease in pc merely diminishes demand for the dominant
¯rm. The two negative e®ects are related to the second term of @2¼d(p¤d)=@qd@qc in (3). In this
model setting, the direct e®ect is dominated by the two negative e®ects. Therefore, an increase
in qc diminishes the incentive of the dominant ¯rm to engage in quality improvement.
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4 Duopoly with competitive fringe ¯rms
We extend the basic model by incorporating another dominant ¯rm. We call this situation a
\duopoly with fringe ¯rms." Firms 1 and 2 produce products with quality q1 and q2, respec-
tively (q1 > q2). Competitive fringe ¯rms produce products with quality qc. Firms 1 and 2
compete in quantity (Bonnano (1986) and Motta (1993)). To simplify the analysis, we assume
that F (µ) = µ.
Consumer µ1 is indi®erent between ¯rms 1 and 2, and is represented as
¡p1 + µ1q1 = ¡p2 + µ1q2 ! µ1 = p1 ¡ p2
q1 ¡ q2 :
Consumer µ2 is indi®erent between ¯rm 2 and competitive fringe ¯rms, and is represented as
¡p2 + µ2q2 = ¡pc + µ2qc ! µ2 = p2 ¡ pc
q2 ¡ qc :
The demands for ¯rms 1 and 2, d1 and d2, are given by
d1 = 1¡ µ1 = 1¡ p1 ¡ p2
q1 ¡ q2 ; d2 = µ1 ¡ µ2 =
p1 ¡ p2
q1 ¡ q2 ¡
p2 ¡ pc
q2 ¡ qc :
We have to invert the system of demand functions. This gives the following inverse demand
functions:
p1(d1; d2) = q1 + pc ¡ qc ¡ (q1 ¡ qc)d1 ¡ (q2 ¡ qc)d2; (4)
p2(d1; d2) = q2 + pc ¡ qc ¡ (q2 ¡ qc)d2 ¡ (q2 ¡ qc)d1: (5)
The pro¯ts of ¯rms 1 and 2 are
¼1 = p1(d1; d2)d1; ¼2 = p2(d1; d2)d2:
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to
d¤1 =
pc + 2q1 ¡ q2 ¡ qc
4q1 ¡ q2 ¡ 3qc ;
d¤2 =
(2q1 ¡ q2 ¡ qc)pc + (q1 ¡ qc)(q2 ¡ qc)
(q2 ¡ qc)(4q1 ¡ q2 ¡ 3qc) ;
d¤c =
qc(q1 ¡ qc)(q2 ¡ qc)¡ ((q1 ¡ qc)2 + 2(q1(q2 ¡ qc) + q2(q1 ¡ q2)))pc
qc(q2 ¡ qc)(4q1 ¡ q2 ¡ 3qc) :
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Note that d¤c is the demand for fringe ¯rms and is derived by dc = (p2 ¡ pc)=(q2 ¡ qc)¡ pc=qc.
For any i 2 f1; 2; cg, d¤i must be larger than 0. We therefore impose the following assumption:
pc <
qc(q1 ¡ qc)(q2 ¡ qc)
(q1 ¡ qc)2 + 2(q1(q2 ¡ qc) + q2(q1 ¡ q2)) :
The pro¯ts of the ¯rms are
¼¤1 = (q1 ¡ qc)(d¤1)2;
¼¤2 = (q2 ¡ qc)(d¤2)2:
4.1 Price reduction
As in the previous section, we derive the cross partial derivatives of the pro¯ts to evaluate the
e®ect of a decrease in pc on the incentives of ¯rm 1 and 2 to engage in quality investments.
The partial derivatives and the cross partial derivatives of the pro¯ts are given as
@¼¤1
@q1
=
(pc + 2q1 ¡ q2 ¡ qc)(7(q1 ¡ qc)2 + (q1 ¡ q2)2 ¡ (4p1 + p2 ¡ 5pc)pc)
(4q1 ¡ q2 ¡ 3qc)3 ;
@¼¤2
@q2
= ((q1 ¡ qc)(q2 ¡ qc) + (2q1 ¡ q2 ¡ qc)pc)
£ (q1 ¡ qc)(q2 ¡ qc)(4q1 + q2 ¡ 5qc)¡ (7(q1 ¡ qc)
2 + (q1 ¡ q2)2)pc
(q2 ¡ qc)2(4q1 ¡ q2 ¡ 3qc)3 ;
@2¼¤1
@q1@pc
= ¡2((4q1 + q2 ¡ 5qc)pc ¡ (q2 ¡ qc)
2)
(4q1 ¡ q2 ¡ 3qc)3 ;
@2¼¤2
@q2@pc
= ¡2f(q1 ¡ qc)(q2 ¡ qc)
3 + (2q1 ¡ q2 ¡ qc)(7(q1 ¡ qc)2 + (q1 ¡ q2)2)pcg
(q2 ¡ qc)2(4q1 ¡ q2 ¡ 3qc)3 :
From the equations, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A decrease in pc enhances the marginal gain from the marginal increase in qi
(i = 1; 2) given the other values; that is, @2¼¤i =@qi@pc < 0 if and only if
(q2 ¡ qc)2
4q1 + q2 ¡ 5qc < pc <
qc(q1 ¡ qc)(q2 ¡ qc)
(q1 ¡ qc)2 + 2(q1(q2 ¡ qc) + q2(q1 ¡ q2))
. Otherwise, a decrease in pc enhances the marginal gain from the marginal increase in q2, but
diminishes that from the marginal increase in q1.
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As in the standard vertical di®erentiation model, the product of ¯rm 2 is more similar to that
of fringe ¯rms than that of ¯rm 1. Because of this similarity, a change in pc a®ects ¯rm 2 more.
The inequality, @d¤2=@pc > @d¤1=@pc, re°ects this property.
As in the previous section, a decrease in pc enhances the incentive of ¯rm 2 to engage in
quality investment. The decrease in pc, however, diminishes the amount of quantity supplied
by ¯rm 2, d¤2, due to the shrinking of the inverse demand for ¯rm 2, p2(d1; d2). Because of the
strategic substitution between the productions of ¯rms 1 and 2, the decrease in d2 enhances
the amount of quantity supplied by ¯rm 1, d1 (an e®ect we call the \strategic e®ect"). The
decrease in pc, however, shrinks the inverse demand for ¯rm 1, p1(d1; d2) (an e®ect we call
the \direct e®ect"). The latter two e®ects are trade-o®s in the incentive of ¯rm 1 to engage
in quality investment. On the one hand, the direct e®ect does not depend on the exogenous
parameters (see (4) and (5)), which means that @pi(d1; d2)=@pc = 1 is constant. On the other
hand, the strategic e®ect depends on the exogenous parameters. We can easily ¯nd this by
deriving the reaction functions of the ¯rms:
d1(d2) =
q1 + pc ¡ qc ¡ (q2 ¡ qc)d2
2(q1 ¡ qc) ; (6)
d2(d1) =
q2 + pc ¡ qc ¡ (q2 ¡ qc)d1
2(q2 ¡ qc) : (7)
Because q1¡ qc > q2¡ qc, a decrease in pc diminishes d2(d1) more than it reduces d1(d2). This
tendency becomes stronger as the value of q1 increases. Because of this tendency, the strategic
e®ect is stronger than the direct e®ect if the value of q1 is large enough.
Numerical example We consider a two-stage game. First, ¯rms 1 and 2 engage in quality
investments given their ex ante quality levels. Second, given the investment levels, the two ¯rms
simultaneously determine their quantities supplied. We set the following numerical example:
qc = 1=10, q1 = 1=2 + e1, q2 = 1=5 + e2, and I(ei) = e2i =2, where ei is the quality improvement
level of ¯rm i and I(ei) is the investment cost of ¯rm i. This kind of ex ante ¯rm heterogeneity
is often used in the context of R&D. See, for instance, Barros and Nilssen (1999) and Ishida et
al. (2011).
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We choose two values of pc to check how a decrease in pc changes the incentives of the two
¯rms to engage in quality investments: (i) pc = 1=80 and (ii) pc = 1=100. Under the two cases,
the equilibrium investment levels of the ¯rms are given as follows:
(i) e1 = 0:251222; e2 = 0:081652; (ii) e1 = 0:251228; e2 = 0:082198:
We ¯nd that the decrease in pc from 1=80 to 1=100 enhances the R&D incentives of the ¯rms.
4.2 Quality improvement
We brie°y discuss the e®ect of an increase in qc on the cross partial derivatives of the pro¯ts.
Although the result of the calculus is highly complex, we ¯nd the following properties of the
cross partial derivatives. First, the sign of @2¼¤1=@q1@qc is indeterminate. Second, the sign of
@2¼¤2=@q2@qc is minus. The negative e®ect of an increase in qc on the incentive of ¯rm 2 is
similar to that in the previous section. Because of the negative e®ect, the quantity supplied by
¯rm 1 can increase. This enhances the incentive of ¯rm 1 to engage in quality investment.
5 Conclusion
We investigate what kind of competitive pressure induces existing ¯rms to engage in more
intensive innovation activities. We examine two types of competitive pressure: a price decrease
in competitive fringe ¯rms and a quality improvement therein. We use an oligopoly model
with vertical di®erentiation to investigate this question. This model setting enables us to
investigate the e®ect of competitive pressure on ¯rms producing di®erent kinds of product
qualities. We believe that this model setting captures the example of the Taiwanese bicycle
industry mentioned earlier in the Introduction: the two leading ¯rms are analogous to Giant
and Merida, and the decrease in the exogenous price of competitive ¯rms is akin to the threat
of low-cost, low-price competition by small Chinese bicycle ¯rms.
We show that a decrease in the exogenous price of competitive ¯rms induces the existing
leading ¯rms to engage more in quality investments if the ex ante quality level of the highest
quality product is large enough; otherwise, only the mid-quality ¯rm engages more in quality
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investment. We also show that an increase in the exogenous quality level of competitive ¯rms
diminishes the incentive of the mid-quality ¯rm to engage in quality investments. Because our
paper distinguishes between the two e®ects of competition enhancement, a price decrease in
competitive products and a quality improvement in competitive products, we can clarify the
di®erence between the two e®ects. Our results add a new insight to the existing knowledge on
R&D and on the quality standard. Moreover, our result clearly indicates the condition that
existing ¯rms can collaborate with each other in their R&D activities, which provides a useful
managerial implication for existing companies facing competitive threats from emerging ¯rms.
We do not consider cooperative actions concerning R&D between existing ¯rms. In partic-
ular, in the example discussed in our paper, the manner in which the ¯rms collaborate is an
important topic. In our paper, we believe that we partially answer why ¯rms form an R&D
collaboration network. One of the possible reasons is that both ¯rms need product quality
improvements. If this does not hold, it is di±cult to form such an R&D collaboration network.
We need to further investigate why ¯rms form an R&D collaboration network and how they
coordinate within the network. This is left for future research.
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